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I. Introduction
In 2005, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (the Protocol) came into force.'
* Associate Director, Adolescent Health Programs, National Partnership for Women
& Families; Adjunct Professor, American University Washington College of Law. The
author would like to thank Frances Eberhard, Paul Gugliuzza, Zinaida Miller, and Marya
Torrez for their comments on earlier drafts. The author is particularly grateful to Professor
Charles Ngwena for his leadership in the field of reproductive rights and for organizing the
symposium, "Reproductive and Sexual Health and the African Women's Protocol," with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice.
1. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of
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Since that time, the Protocol has received scant attention in legal
scholarship. Where the Protocol has been mentioned, by and large it has
received praise as a major step forward for women's rights on the
continent.2 Much of that praise is merited. The Protocol includes broad
rights to non-discrimination, equality, and dignity, and it addresses a variety
of areas such as labor and employment, marriage and the family, the legal
system, the political process and public life, education, conflict, the market,
the environment, and health.3
Drafted over eight years, the process for creating the document was
marked by stops and starts, political compromise, and the influence of a
strong movement lead by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The
text of the Protocol reflects the central purposes of those who lobbied for a
regional instrument that focused on women's rights. First, the Protocol
sought to fill in the gaps in the region's central human rights instrumentthe African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the Charter).5 The
Charter only references women's equality in two places6 and was rarely
Women in Africa, adopted July 11, 2003, reprinted in Martin Semalulu Nsibirwa, A Brief
Analysis of the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights in
Africa, 1 AFR. HuM. RTS. L.J. 40, 53 (2001) (entered into force Nov. 25, 2005) [hereinafter
Protocol].
2.

See, e.g., ROSEMARY SEMAFUMU MUKASA, THE AFRICAN WOMEN'S PROTOCOL:

HARNESSING A POTENTIAL FOR POSITIVE CHANGE (2008); cf Rachel Murray, Women's
Rights and the Organization of African Unity and African Union: The Protocol on the
Rights of Women in Africa, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: MODERN FEMINIST APPROACHES 253,

264 (Doris Buss & Ambreena Manji eds., 2005) (critiquing the approach of the Protocol
generally as wavering between two objectives); Rachel Rebouchd, Labor, Land, and
Women's Rights in Africa: Challengesfor the New Protocol on the Rights of Women, 19
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 235, 236 (2006) (explaining the use of a more focused approach to
strengthen some control while loosening other constraints placed on women by African
customs).
3. See Murray, supra note 2, at 268 (noting that although "the Protocol covers
economic, social and cultural rights," it is broader in other areas).
4. Melinda Adams & Alice Kang, RegionalAdvocacy Networks and the Protocolon
the Rights of Women in Africa, 3 POL. & GENDER 451, 459 (2007).
5. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 59
(entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter Charter]. The Charter has been ratified by all
fifty-three member states of the Organization of African Unity/African Union. Christof
Heyns, The African Regional Human Rights System: The African Charter,108 PENN ST. L.
REv. 679, 683 (2004). See also Protocol, supra note 1, Preamble ("Despite the ratification
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other international human rights
instruments by the majority of States Parties.... women in Africa still continue to be
victims of discrimination and harmful practices.").
6. See Charter, supra note 5, art. 18(3) (eliminating discrimination against women);
id art. 2 (prohibiting sexual discrimination in particular and entitling individuals to equality
before the law and equal protection of the law, though not referencing gender).
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used to support women's rights.7 Second, proponents of a Protocol sought
to create ownership for women's rights in a context where rights are often
criticized as elitist or as challenging cultural norms.8 As has been noted,
"[I]t is the first instrument of its kind... developed by Africans, for
Africans." 9
Drafters proposed creating an 'African CEDAW"-a
document that would temper the Charter's allegiance to tradition, morals,
and custom with language that would have the legitimacy of international
human rights law but would still address women's lived experiences in a
way that would imbue rights with local purchase and relevancy. " The
Protocol attempts to accomplish these goals in a number of ways. The
Protocol draws heavily from CEDAW and other international documents,
and it includes much of what is already protected in international and
regional instruments. In addition, the Protocol (particularly its early drafts)
broadens the rights in the Charter and includes rights that are not found in
CEDAW or in the Charter.
This Article examines the drafting of an 'African CEDAW' 12 and
concludes that it was a very fragmented process with consequences for the
efficacy of the Protocol as a whole. Part I provides an overview of the
drafting process including a brief critique of the main shortcomings of that
7.
See VINCENT 0. ORLu NMEHIELLE, THE AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM: ITS
LAWS, PRACTICES, AND INSTITUTIONS 133-34 (2001) (stating that before the Protocol, the

African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights had never investigated women's rights
issues using its Article 48 power under the Charter.; see also Bronwen Manby, Civil and
PoliticalRights in the African Charteron Human and Peoples' Rights: Articles 1-7, in THE
AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS: THE SYSTEM IN PRACTICE, 1986-2006,

171, 181 (Rachel Murray & Malcolm Evans eds., 2008) (noting that the discriminatory
aspects of customary law and citizenship law have been the focus of litigation on the
national and international level). Moreover, the Commission has not decided a case
concerning women's rights. Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa, Reclaiming (Wo)manity: The
Merits and Demerits of the African Protocol on Women's Rights, 53 NETHERLANDS INT'L L.

REV. 63, 70 (2006).
AN AFRICAN
8. See FAREDA BANDA, WOMEN, LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
PERSPECTIVE 44 (2005) (citing Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor
of Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT'L L. J. 201 (2001)).
9. Rose Gawaya & Rosemary Semafumu Mukasa, The African Women's Protocol: A
New Dimension for Women's Rights in Africa, 13 GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT 42, 42

(2005).
10. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
11. Report of the Meeting of Experts on the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on
110, Nov. 12-16, 2001,
Human and Peoples' Rights of Women in Africa
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/ hrdocs/african/docs/oau/oaul0.doc (last visited Feb. 19, 2010) (on
file with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
12. Murray, supra note 2, at 253-54.
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process. Part II highlights the dominant influences underpinning the
Protocol by way of textual examples. My analysis reveals a lack of
cohesiveness in the final document that can be traced back to a lack of
vision for the instrument and suggests ways the patchwork approach to the
Protocol may shape its future interpretation. Part III focuses on the health
and reproductive rights in Article 14 in light of the Protocol's theoretical
contradictions. Three problems are analyzed: the failure of the Protocol to
highlight how various articles relate to reproductive health rights (such as
HIV prevention and early marriage), the narrow construction of a broader
right to health (including, as well as independent of, reproductive health),
and the dual rejection and embrace of women's roles as mothers. This last
tension in particular-the intersection of the elimination of stereotypes
found in formal and substantive equality models and the promotion of a
positive cultural context for women-best illustrates tensions in the
theoretical influences that underpin the Protocol. I conclude on an
optimistic note. Although the Protocol may have missed opportunities to
approach women's reproductive health more holistically and critically, the
interpretation of the Protocol moving forward can be supplemented with
defining principles that were underdeveloped in its drafting.
I. The DraftingProcess andIts Difficulties
A. The Intended Purposes of the Protocol
The Protocol was created following a broader movement to protect
women's rights at the regional level.' 3 Nowhere is this clearer than in the
Constitutive Act of the African Union, the treaty that dissolved the4
Organization of African Unity (OAU) and created a new regional body.'
While the Constitutive Act focuses on sovereignty (promoting unity, peace,
and setting out the limits of intervention in state's affairs), it also
acknowledges women in a way that the Charter 5 and OAU's Charter do
13.

See Fareda Banda, Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in

Africa, in THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS:

THE SYSTEM IN

PRACTICE, 1986-2006, 441, 442-43 (Rachel Murray & Malcolm Evans eds., 2008) (stating
that the regional approach to human rights needed reform and that some women's rights
initiatives were even taken on by sub-regions).
14. Constitutive
Act
of
the
African
Union,
July
11,
2000,
http://mirror.undp.org/afi'ican_ unionen/treaties/constitution.pdf (entered into force May 26,
2001).
15. The Charter focused on the protection of state sovereignty. Adrien Katherine
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not. 16 For example, the Preamble speaks to a united and strong Africa7
through partnerships with civil society, "in particular women."'1
4(1) includes the enumerated goal-the "[p]romotion of
Specifically, Article
8
equality."'
gender
It was in this spirit of enthusiasm for women's rights that national,
regional, and international NGOs approached the OAU about a Protocol to
the Charter. The process took shape in 1995 when the Women in Law and
Development in Africa (WiLDAF) co-hosted a seminar with the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (the Commission). 19
Participants passed a resolution calling for a Protocol to the Charter 20 and
the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women. 2' In its
31st Ordinary Session in 1995, the Organization of African Unity Assembly
of Heads of States and Government agreed to invest in the project of
drafting a Protocol.22
Advocates could have revised the Charter rather than drafting a
Protocol, 23 but advocates started from the premise that the Charter was too
Wing & Tyler Murray Smith, The New African Union and Women's Rights, 13 TRANSNAT'L
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 58 (2003).
16. See Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, Back to the Future: The Imperative of Prioritizing
for the Protection of Human Rights in Africa, 47 J. AFR. L. 1, 9 (2003) (noting that the
OAU's Charter reflected states' insecurities about newly won independence, and thus
couched rights in sovereignty and domestic governance).
17. Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 14, Preamble.
18. Id. art. 4. Gender equality is a principle and not an "objective" under Article 3 of
the Charter, although the Charter recognizes the objectives of preventing disease and
promoting good health as well as promoting human rights and "other relevant human rights
instruments." Charter, supra note 5, art. 3.
19. Adams & Kang, supranote 4, at 460.
at
20. Forty-four representatives from the Commission and NGOs participated. See id.
460 (explaining that the Charter was "inefficient and affected women in contradictory ways"
creating a need for a "more responsive" Charter) (citations omitted).
21. African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Special Rapporteur on the
Rights of Women in Africa, http://www.achpr.orglenglish/info/index-women-en.html
(follow "Mandate and Bibliographic Notes") (last visited October 18, 2009) (explaining the
creation of the position to "reinforce and promote rights of women in Africa") (on file with
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
22. AHG Res. 240, 31st Sess. (June 1995).
23. Before the Protocol, Article 18 read in conjunction with Article 2 had been
interpreted as conferring the rights found in international documents like CEDAW (such as a
state duty to modify customs that discriminate). See Fitnat Naa-Adjeley Adjetey,
Reclaiming the African Woman's Individuality: The Struggle Between Women's
Reproductive Autonomy and African Society and Culture, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1351, 1371
(1995) (explaining how one country's realization that certain cultural norms and traditions
are counterproductive to women's rights and legislation may be required to rectify the
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majority of member states on new language be challenging, 25 but advocates
believed that passing the number and scope of amendments necessary to
cure the Charter's deficiencies would be daunting.26 The Charter explicitly
refers to women in only two places. Article 2 includes the category of sex
in the non-discrimination clause, 2 and Article 18(3) states: "The State shall
ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and also
ensure the protection of the rights of the woman and the child as stipulated
in international declarations and conventions. 2 8 Some have argued that
these two provisions, taken with the non-gendered equal protection
guarantee in Article 329 and the deference accorded to international
standards in Articles326030 and 61,31 imply broader protection for women's
rights in the Charter.
problems).
24. See Murray, supra note 2, at 261 n.51 (citing a WiLDAF publication).
25. See Charter, supra note 5, art. 55 (demonstrating a requirement of a simple
majority of member states to amend the Charter).
26. See NMEHIELLE, supra note 7, at 244. (summarizing a dominant argument that "the
Charter, as a document that is inspired by the virtues and the values of African civilization,
cannot per se be an effective tool to protect the rights of women in view of the role of
women in the traditional African family").
27. Article 2 states in full: Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the
rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of
any kind such as race, ethnic group, color, sex, language, religion, political or any other
opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status. Charter, supra note 5, art. 2.
28. Charter, supra note 5, art. 18(3); see id. art. 18(4) (concluding with a clause that
guarantees a right to special measures for the "aged and disabled" that are "in keeping with
their physical and moral needs").
29. See id. art. 3 ("1. Every individual shall be equal before the law. 2. Every
individual shall be entitled to equal protection of the law.").
30. Article 60 states in full:
The Commission shall draw inspiration from international law on human and
peoples' rights, particularly from the provisions of various African instruments
on human and peoples' rights, the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of
the Organization of African Unity, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
other instruments adopted by the United Nations and by African countries in the
field of human and peoples' rights as well as from the provisions of various
instruments adopted within the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations of
which the parties to the present Charter are members.
Id. art. 60.
31. Article 61 states in full:
The Commission shall also take into consideration, as subsidiary measures to
determine the principles of law, other general or special international
conventions, laying down rules expressly recognized by member states of the
Organization of African Unity, African practices consistent with international
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Critics of this interpretation note that the Charter's deference to
international law pales in comparison to its emphasis on protecting familial
and cultural values, which many in the regional (and international)
women's rights movement saw as contradictory to women's equality.33 In
one example substantiating critics' fears, Article 17 and Article 29 of the
Charter were cited by national courts to undermine gender equality claims
under customary law.34 Article 17 provides for a state duty to promote
morals and traditional values that are recognized by the community. 5
Article 29 elaborates on the special role of the state and the individual in
protecting cultural norms and morals.3 6
For those supporting a new protocol, the structure of Article 18, the
only article of the Charter that refers to "women" was emblematic of the
norms on human and people's rights, customs generally accepted as law, general
principles of law recognized by African states as well as legal precedents and
doctrine.
Id. art. 61
32. See Chaloka Beyani, Toward a More Effective Guarantee of Women's Rights in
the African System, in HuMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN:

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL

285, 285 (Rebecca Cook ed., 1995) (explaining that the generally accepted
standards of human rights in Africa "may have a particular status within general
international law."); see also NMEHIELLE, supra note 7, at 245-46 ("Articles 60 and 61
ensured that other international instruments could be incorporated into the Charter through
the interpretation of its provisions.").
33. NMEHIELLE, supra note 7, at 243-45.
34. See Center for Reproductive Rights, The Protocol on the Rights of Women in
Africa: An Instrumentfor Advancing Reproductive and Sexual Rights (Briefing Paper) 2-4
(Feb. 2006), http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/pub-bpafrica.pdf (noting widespread acceptance that Charter has been ineffective for women and
the basis for national courts to undermine women's rights); see also Charter, supra note 5,
art. 17(3) ("The promotion and protection of morals and traditional values recognized by the
community shall be the duty of the State.").
35. Charter, supra note 5, art. 17.
36. Article 29 states in pertinent part:
The individual shall also have the duty: 1. to preserve the harmonious
development of the family and to work for the cohesion and respect of the
family; to respect his parents at all times, to maintain them in case of need; 2. To
serve his national community by placing his physical and intellectual abilities at
its service; ... 4. To preserve and strengthen social and national solidarity,
particularly when the latter is threatened; ... 7. To preserve and strengthen
positive African cultural values in his relations with other members of the
society, in the spirit of tolerance, dialogue and consultation and, in general, to
contribute to the promotion of the moral well being of society; 8. To contribute
to the best of his abilities, at all times and at all levels, to the promotion and
achievement of African unity.
Id. art. 29.
PERSPECTIVES
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Charter's recognition of gender in terms of family roles. First, Article 18(3)
marries women's rights with rights related to the rights of children.37 Other
international human rights documents have taken a similar position; the
American Convention on Human Rights3 8 is one example.39 This approach
has been heavily criticized for being at odds with protections for individual
autonomy and equality between men and women as envisioned by
international human rights documents like CEDAW that focus on the
elimination of stereotypes. 4° Furthermore, Article 18(1) focuses on the
protection of the family as the "natural unit and basis of society," and
obliges the states to "take care of its physical health and moral."' Article
18(2) further requires the state "to assist the family which is the custodian
of morals and traditional values recognized by the community. 4 2 The
Charter does not define morals or values or which community is to define
them and how. And the Charter does not indicate how the state is to help
families protect those poorly-defined values.
A generous reading of Article 18 offered by at least one scholar is that
it imposes a duty on states to "create societal conditions in which families

37. See Heyns, supra note 5, at 687-88 (arguing that the "lumping together of women
and children" perpetuates "outdated stereotypes").
38. Article 17 of the American Convention on Human Rights states in part:
1. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is
entitled to protection by society and the state. 2. The right of men and
women of marriageable age to marry and to raise a family shall be
recognized, if they meet the conditions required by domestic laws,
insofar as such conditions do not affect the principle of
nondiscrimination established in this Convention ....
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673 (entered
into force July 18, 1978).
39. NMEHIELLE, supra note 7, at 132.
40. See, e.g., International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, Egypt,
Sept. 5-13, 1994, Programme of Action, $ 4.19, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13 (Oct. 18, 1994)
("Schools, the media and other social institutions should seek to eliminate stereotypes in all
types of communication and educational materials that reinforce existing inequities between
males and females and undermine girls' self-esteem."); The Fourth World Conference on
Women: Action for Equality, Development and Peace, Beijing, China, Sept. 4-15, 1995,
Beiing Declaration and Platform for Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20 and
A/CONF.177/20/ADD/1 [hereinafter Beijing Platform] (discussing concerns over gender
role stereotypes throughout the document). See also BANDA, supranote 8, at 183 (noting the
ICPD revolutionized thinking about reproductive matters by changing the paradigm from
family planning and population control to individual women's rights to decision-making and
personal well-being).
41. Charter, supra note 5,art. 18(1).
42. Id. art. 18(2)
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might flourish., 4 3 But the type of family that the Charter might envision, as
a unit grounded in tradition and community norms, may be fixed. The
protection of the Charter may not extend to any configuration of the family;
rather, the document protects only those families that are in step with
conceptions of community norms that value male-headed, heterosexual
households. 44 Even if the recognition of what would help families flourish
includes an appreciation for the rights of women in the family, many have
highlighted that cultural morals and values are often in tension with
women's rights. 45 The demarcation of family roles in customary law or in
community practice has been a point of conflict between the agenda for
women's equality and many African customs. Custom that is patriarchal in
the true sense of the word-such as rules that confer property ownership
and decision-making to men exclusively, for example-has been criticized
as oppressive and antithetical to equality. 46 This is not to ignore the rich
literature that questions the dichotomy between culture and equality. 47 But
situating women's human rights as contingent on family identity supports
some advocates' worst fears that women will feel pressure to conform to
traditional expectations for wives and mothers. As the last Part of this
Article highlights, the identification of women as family members and the
prevalence and strength of that association in many African cultures
stigmatizes single women or women without children as well as

43. NMEHIELLE, supranote 7, at 131-32. See also Adjetey, supra note 23, at 1376-77
(noting that the reference to cultural values is also ill-defined).
44. See NMEHIELLE, supra note 7, at 77 (explaining how the Charter could be
interpreted as promoting a heterosexual conception of the family given the decision to omit
sexual orientation from the Protocol debates and the general antipathy toward same-sex
relationships in many African countries).
45. Adams & Kang, supra note 4, at 460.
46. NMEHIELLE, supra note 7, at 134, 244. See also ROSEMARY SEMAFUMU MUKASA,
THE AFRICA WOMEN'S PROTOCOL:

A TOOL TO MOBILISE RESOURCES FOR FINANCING

GENDER EQUALITY AND WOMEN'S EMpOWERMENT Pincite (forthcoming 2010) (noting the
widespread existence of traditional practices in three African countries that are harmful to
women) (on file with the author). This is not a critique limited to the African context.
International women's rights advocates have long argued that situating women in families
has excluded them from the reach of public international law. See, e.g., Karen Engle, Views
from the Margins: A Response to David Kennedy, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 105, 106-07 (1994)
("[C]ommercial activity has often been seen as providing an exception to the application of
public international law.").
47. Scholars such as Tracy Higgins have studied custom that both empowers and
limits women's agency. See Mukasa, supra note 9, at 48 (describing how a lack of cultural
influence on women's rights and weak political policies that recognize gender equality both
contribute to the problems in achieving autonomy for women).
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overemphasizes women's caretaking role.48 The problem of stereotyping
remains-that the protection of women's rights is tied to their roles in
families as wives or mothers.49
The project of writing a Protocol was intended to mitigate some of
these tensions by acknowledging the importance of African cultural
traditions and promoting those values which complement women's rights to
equality and dignity. This meant creating ownership of the document,
which drafters sought to do by (1) emphasizing women's participation in
writing the Protocol and (2) focusing on women's roles in creating
community and cultural practices and values. 50 Advocates also highlighted
issues ignored by the Charter (and the Commission) by incorporating rights
enumerated in international documents like CEDAW, but changed the
wording to acknowledge the practices of various African communities. For
instance, the right of consent to marriage and to the equality of spouses, 1
drew attention to women's rights within community and family but used
language suited to an African regional instrument. 2
B. History of the DraftingProcess
With these motivations in mind, in 1997, two years after the WiLDAF
meeting, members of the Commission convened a working group of experts
to write a first draft of the Protocol.53 This group consisted of Commission
members, representatives from African NGOs, and international
observers.54 One commentator noted that the working group did not appear
to have any sense of the Protocol's ideal or desired content.55 Although the
first draft tried to mirror the structure of the Charter, expanding as well as
48. BANDA, supra note 8, at 91.
49. See id. at 91 (explaining the role of motherhood and noting the how custody is
awarded to mothers and fathers based on the age and sufficiency of the child).
50. See id. at 69 (noting the final draft's treatment of the right to positive cultural
context in Article 17).
51. Protocol, supra note 1, art. 6.
52. NMEHIELLE, supra note 7, at 244.
53. Mary Wandia, Ratification of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa: The Comoros Lead the Way, FEMNET,
Jan. 1, 2004, at 2, http://old.apc.org/english/capacity/policy/mmtk ictpol-humanrightsAfricanCharter_protocol.doc (last visited Feb. 19, 2010) (on file with Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
54. Id.
55. BANDA, supranote 8, at 68.
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adding rights, overall it looked like a "wish list" of areas to end
discrimination against women and focused on issues related to family life,
violence, and cultural practices. 56 The 1997 draft was then submitted to the
Commission for comments.5 7 At this point, NGOs that had reviewed the
draft took an active role in moving the process forward, but were less
involved in debating the substance of the text. The International
Commission of Jurists (ICY) hosted a workshop in late 1997 to help
facilitate NGOs' comments on the draft and passed a resolution calling for
completion of the drafting process.5 8 The NGO lobby met with some
success-the Commission met with the ICJ, WiLDAF, and other
organizations to amend the draft and set the terms for the appointment of a
Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women. 59 In July 1998 at the
Commission's 23rd Session, the Commission formally endorsed the
appointment of the Special Rapporteur and selected a Commissioner as
Rapporteur to shepherd the drafting process. 60 The Special Rapporteur
convened another working group of experts to consider the draft.6' In so
doing, she was criticized for failing to seek wide consultation.
Commentators noted that she excluded many NGOs, observers, and state
representatives by only seeking input from government representatives of
seven of fifty-three states.62
In the next year the Commission adopted a draft Protocol 63 (as revised
64
by the Special Rapporteur) and sent the draft to OAU for consideration.
The 1999 draft consisted of twenty-three articles and focused on
discrimination, the elimination of harmful traditional practices, and
violence against women, as the previous draft had.65 What is striking is that
despite two years of movement (the mobilization of civil society and the
appointment of a Special Rapporteur) the draft's substance had not changed
56.

Id. at 68-69.

57.

Wandia, supra note 53, at 2.

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Murray, supra note 2, at 263 n. 58 (noting that many NGOs did not see a copy
of the Draft Protocol until the 2001 Experts Meeting); see also BANDA, supra note 8, at 75
(noting complaints from NGOs regarding a lack of consultation).
63. Draft Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women, Nov. 15, 1999,
DOC/OS (XXVII)/159b.
64. BANDA, supra note 8, at 74.
65. Odinkalu, supra note 16, at 21.
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all that much. The noticeable difference was that the draft was organized
more like CEDAW in that it addressed areas of public or private life where
women were subject to discrimination or disparate treatment and relied less
on the structure of the Charter.6 6 The Commission had made only a few
amendments at this stage: It revised the language to emphasize the rights of
the girl-child, added provisions on the elderly and the disabled, and put
forward an absolute prohibition of polygamy. 67 The draft was sent to the
OAU in 2000.
The OAU Women's Unit sought to amend the draft-to add language
from African regional instruments (of significance was the incorporation of
the then-draft Convention on Harmful Traditional Practices 68) and to gather
and incorporate the input of Member States. 69 The Southern African
Development Community also suggested changes to the provisions on
violence, temporary measures, and states' ability to make reservations.7 °
The draft shifted between organizations, each adding and deleting language
of certain rights. There was very little communication among the bodies
revising the draft or with civil society.
In 2001, the OAU General Secretariat convened a Government Experts
Meeting (the Experts Meeting) and representatives from forty-four states
were in attendance. NGO and international organizations were allowed to
participate as observers. Interestingly, state representatives both rolled
back rights in the first draft and included higher standards than those
already in international human rights law.7 1 Participants at the Experts
Meeting added rights for refugees, asylum seekers, and internally displaced
and returnees; they added protection for "women in distress;" and they
strengthened the Protocol's treatment of temporary special measures. At
the same time, major disagreements erupted over the complementarity of
men's and women's roles, the inclusion of gender and sexual orientation in
the definition of discrimination (although this revision was not included in
66. See BANDA, supra note 8, at 70 (noting the similarity between the Protocol draft
and CEDAW for rights within the family).
67. Id. at 73.
68. Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights
of African Women in Africa, CABILE/66.6/Rev.1, Sept. 13, 2000 (entered into force Nov.
25, 2005); see also Wandia, supra note 53 (noting assistance by the Inter African Committee
to merge the draft Protocol with the Draft Convention on Traditional Practices).
69. See BANDA, supra note 8, at 74 (noting that the OAU's revisions included changes
to the articles on education, economic and social and welfare rights, and the article on health
and reproductive rights).
70. Id. at 75-76.
71. Banda, supra note 13, at 447.
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the final draft), states' abilities to limit women's right to72 pass their
nationality on to their children; and the right to control fertility.
Fights that had been settled in prior discussions were rehashed,
sometimes with differing results, and perspectives that had been absent
from initial meetings resurfaced at various points with discordant effects.
The most controversial issue was polygamy. Issues that cut to the heart of
family roles and tradition-polygamy being an example-were the focus of
debates at the Experts Meeting.73 The 1997 draft had condemned polygamy
but did not prohibit it where all parties consented. But the 1999 draft
included an absolute prohibition of polygamy, largely due to NGO
pressure.74 In 2001, participants at the Experts Meeting could not agree on
polygamy and left three options bracketed in the 2001 draft. The third
option, which prefers monogamy but does not require it and emphasizes
consent in polygamous relationships, was finally chosen at a second
Experts Meeting in 2003. 75 Rachel Murray notes that the discussion on
polygamy reopened a debate that had been settled in OAU documents and
in CEDAW General Recommendation 21. 76 For example, CEDAW's
General Recommendation 21 had concluded that polygamy "contravenes a
woman's right
to equality with men, and.., ought to be discouraged and
77
prohibited.

72. See BANDA, supra note 8, at 71 (discussing the controversial nature of provision
granting certain rights to women).
73. Id. at 76.
74. Id. at 74.
75. Of the other two options for polygamy, one clause would have prohibited it
whereas the second option would have recognized monogamy only, but protected women
currently in polygamous unions. Also, the 2001 Experts Meeting failed to reach agreement
on the article concerning monitoring and the article on amending the Protocol. See Adams
& Kang, supra note 4, at 461; see also Protocol, supra note 1, art. 6(c) ("[M]onogamy is
encouraged as the preferred form of marriage and that the rights of women in marriage and
family, including in polygamous marital relationships are promoted and protected.").
76. See Murray, supra note 2, at 267 n.86-88.
77. Paragraph 14 of General Recommendation 21 states in full:
States parties' reports also disclose that polygamy is practised in a number of
countries. Polygamous marriage contravenes a woman's right to equality with
men, and can have such serious emotional and financial consequences for her
and her dependents that such marriages ought to be discouraged and prohibited.
The Committee notes with concern that some States parties, whose constitutions
guarantee equal rights, permit polygamous marriage in accordance with personal
or customary law. This violates the constitutional rights of women, and breaches
the provisions of article 5 (a) of the Convention."
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Thirteenth Session,
General Recommendation No. 21, Equality in Marriage and Family Relations, 14, 49th
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There was little continuity between drafts of the Protocol. More
fundamentally, the inability to reach a consensus until the very last stage of
drafting shows how contentious the treatment of family and culture were.
At the conclusion of the 2001 Experts Meeting, delegates agreed that
further review of a revised draft was needed, as disagreement among states
continued to exist. Participants agreed to meet again at a second Experts
Meeting, but in 2002, two meetings were scheduled and cancelled for lack
of a quorum.
NGOs met in June 2002 and passed the "Durban
Declaration," which called for expedient adoption of the Protocol and
effective participation of government experts.7 8 At a subsequent meeting in
January 2003, a coalition of NGOs developed a strategy for completing the
Protocol.79 Organizations pooled their comments in a collective markup of
the 2001 draft and focused on incorporating international standards already
ratified by countries at the experts' table.8 °
Sally Engle Merry has noted similar strategies employed by advocates
drafting international treaties. In her scholarship on treaty and declaration
drafting, she notes that reaching a consensus is the driving force of states'
and civil society's discussions, despite resulting in vague and wordy
documents. 81 The consensus she describes is rarely evidence-driven and is
more focused on inserting text from other international or regional
documents to which states have already agreed.82 The process, she
concludes, conceals and perpetuates intractable differences between
states.83
Civil society did not address those differences, but instead pushed for
an end to the drafting process. 84 NGOs directed their attention toward their
own governments and pushed for ministers and state representatives to
Sess., Supp. No. 38, U.N. Doc. A/49/38 (Apr. 12, 1994).
78. See Adams & Kang, supra note 4, at 461 (discussing Durban Declaration results).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Sally E. Merry, Human Rights and Global Legal Pluralism: Reciprocity and
Disjuncture, in MOBILE PEOPLE, MOBILE LAW: EXPANDING LEGAL RELATIONS IN A
CONTRACTING WORLD 215, 221 (Franz von Benda-Beckmann et al. eds., 2005).
82. See id. ("Using 'agreed-upon language' meant that there was no need for further
debate, nor was further debate even appropriate since global consensus already existed about
this language.").
83. See id. at 229 ("Localization of human rights does not mean that their cultural
content is transformed.").
84. This is not to imply that the fear that the Protocol would not be finished was
illegitimate. At some point, advocates had to make the decision whether to fight ideological
battles or to move the process of drafting to its conclusion.
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commit to a second Experts Meeting to complete the Protocol. In March
2003, well over a year after the first Experts Meeting, a second Experts
Meeting resulted in textual changes to the 2001 draft, but few substantive
changes. The following disagreements are noteworthy: Libya, Mali,
Senegal, and Togo objected to the right to decide the number and spacing of
children even though the same language is found in CEDAW and those
states are signatories to CEDAW without reservations;8 5 Tunisia and Sudan
objected to the minimum age of marriage; and Burundi, Libya, Senegal, and
Sudan objected to the health and reproductive rights in Article 14
generally.86
Immediately following the second Experts Meeting, the Protocol was
adopted by the Second African Union Summit on July 11, 2003.87
Women's rights organizations launched a wide-scale campaign for
ratification so that the Protocol would come into force. 88 The African
Union supported this campaign, as demonstrated in the 2004 adoption of a
Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa, which reinforces
provisions found in the Protocol. The Protocol came into force on
November 25, 2005, with the ratification of Togo-the fifteenth state to
sign and ratify the Protocol.89
C. What the DraftingProcess Suggests
Advocates for a Protocol looked to on international human rights
documents.
The Protocol was viewed as a way "to allow African
governments to fulfill the international commitments [to which] they have
subscribed." 90 Drafters primarily relied on CEDAW, but also looked to the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the International Covenant on
85. BANDA, supra note 8, at 78 n.254.
86. Id.at 78. In addition, South Africa and Botswana objected to the death penalty
prohibition for pregnant or nursing women. Id. South Africa objected because it no longer
has the death penalty and Libya objected to the protection of women in armed conflict in
Article 11(3). Id.
87. See Press Release, Victory for Women's Rights in Africa, PAMBAZUKA NEws, Oct.
28, 2005, available at http://www.mail-archive.com/pambazuka-news@pambazuka.org/msg
00026.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2005) (discussing entry into force of the Protocol and the
progressive rights the agreement grants women) (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of
Civil Rights and Social Justice).

88.

Id.

89. Id.
90. Drafting Process of the Draft Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, 27th
Session, April-May 2000, DOC/OS (XXVII)/159b, at 1.
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Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the International
Convention on Population and Development (ICPD), and the Beijing
Platform of the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing Platform).9 1
But the resulting text based on these influences "waivers between being an
interpretation of the [Charter] for women on the one hand, and a collection
(not a comprehensive
one) of some existing international standards on the
92
other.
As noted above, the first draft looked like a list of rights that attempted
to mirror the structure of the Charter.93 As the process evolved, the
Protocol began to look less like the Charter and to rely more on language
from international documents that African states had ratified in order to
give the Protocol a wider scope.94 At one stage, the OAU added rights to
complement regional instruments, and at another stage, government experts
amended text to reflect compromises on issues such as polygamy, property
division upon divorce, and the right to pass nationality on to children. 9
The resulting draft Protocol reflected this piecemeal approach to
incorporating influences from the Charter, CEDAW, and other regional and
international human rights documents. The problem was that the Protocol's
drafting proceeded without a clear philosophy for its content: "The
omission of some international standards but the inclusion of others does
not give a clear vision of what it intends to reflect, and the Protocol is not
consistent about its use of African instruments or jurisprudence. 9 6 Rights
were added and rearranged, particularly at the 2001 Experts Meeting, but
not as part of a comprehensive discussion about the Protocol's ideal
content. As the 97next Part discusses, the resulting document's structure
lacks consistency.
This criticism is not intended to undermine the many ways in which
the Protocol goes beyond the international standards on which it is
premised. Discussed in greater depth below, the health and reproductive
rights in Article 14 provide an example: The limited right to an abortion
moves beyond the ICPD, Beijing Platform, and CEDAW. But the Protocol
91.
92.
93.
94.
already
95.
96.
97.

Murray, supra note 2, at 264 n.65.
Id. at 264.
Id.
See BANDA, supranote 8, at 73 (noting that many of the draft Protocol rights were
in other human rights instruments).
Id. at 73-75.
Murray, supranote 2, at 253.
Id. at 269.
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fails to meet existing international standards as well. For example, the
Protocol is out of step with developments in the global recognition of
reproductive rights and with CEDAW.9 8 Article 14's "right to self
protection and to be protected against sexually transmitted infections,
including HIW/AIDS" is inconsistent with international and regional treaties
that recognize women's particular vulnerability to and needs resulting from
HIV infection. 99
This incoherent vision could be the result of certain characteristics of
the drafting process. There seems to have been varying participation by
NGOs and government experts, and more importantly, their influence
surfaced at different times. It appears that NGOs had much more influence
over the first drafts, but that this influence did not necessarily carry over
into the debates at the Experts Meetings. 100 The strength of the civil society
lobby appears to have been in the campaign to ratify the Protocol and not in
negotiating the nuances of its final content.
The drafting shows a failure to consider how the various purposes of
the Protocol-regional accountability and international legitimacy-were to
converge into a process aligned with a set of defined principles and rights
A treaty drafted
that supported the document's larger purpose.
on the Rights of
Convention
contemporaneously, the United Nations
Persons with Disabilities (the Convention), shows a very different
trajectory. 10' Drafters of the Convention began with eight principles and
the recognition that although the rights of persons with disabilities were
protected elsewhere in international law, the particular needs and voices 1of
02
persons with disabilities continued to be undervalued or unrecognized.
98. See id. at 268 (noting that the Draft Protocol did not provide for temporary special
measures to promote women's participation in public life in the way that CEDAW does).
99. See id. at 266-67 (contrasting the Protocol's passing reference to HIV/AIDS to the
African Commission's Resolution on the HIV/AIDS Pandemic-Threat Against Human
Rights and Humanity and the importance of HIV/AIDS issues to Africa as a whole).
100. It should also be noted that many of the Protocol's rights have a clear imprint of
NGO influence-such as some of the rights to reproductive health.
101. United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. I thank
Rebecca Cook for suggesting I contrast the Convention's drafting to the Protocol's.
For a comparison with the process of writing the South African Constitution at the end of
apartheid see Saras Jagwanth & Christina Murray, No Nation Can Be Free When One Half
oflt Is Enslaved, in THE GENDER OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 233 (Beverley Baines
& Ruth Rubio-Marin eds., 2004) in which the authors discuss the drafters of the South
African Constitution's intent to make gender equality a value that underpinned the entire
constitutional system rather than a principle "added on".
102. These principles are:
(a) Respect for inherent dignity, individual autonomy including the freedom to
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At the beginning of the writing process of the Convention, an Ad Hoc
Committee considered proposals for what a comprehensive, international
convention would look like based on a holistic approach that took into
account the fields of social development, human rights, and nondiscrimination. The Ad Hoc Committee held its first session over ten
working days in which many of the thorny questions about the
Convention's purpose and structure were debated and solidified. Difficult
conversations helped build consensus in the first session, resulting in
agreement among participants (which included a host of member states and
NGOs) to eight sessions in which they would work together to negotiate the
substance of the Convention based on the eight foundational principles. 13
If one of the primary goals of the Protocol was to create an 'African
CEDAW,' a discussion of how the Protocol should meet that purpose could
have fostered the relevancy and legitimacy the drafters envisioned. A welldefined set of principles guiding the drafting process may have resulted in a
document with a more consistent approach that would be better aligned
with the aims of the Protocol. 1 4 Instead, the Protocol was shaped by an
unreflective process among changing participants who negotiated discrete
points rather than broad principles.
As Part II will demonstrate, the Protocol is comprised of a patchwork
of theoretical traditions. A document drawing from the text of various
documents will inevitably carry with it the influences of those texts. Part II
will demonstrate how the Protocol's drafting resulted in a set of rights
whose underlying purposes may conflict or contradict each other. The aim
of the next Part is not to suggest that various understandings of women's

make one's own choices, and independence of persons; (b) Non-discrimination;
(c) Full and effective participation and inclusion in society; (d) Respect for
difference and acceptance of persons with disabilities as part. of human diversity
and humanity; (e) Equality of opportunity; (f) Accessibility; (g) Equality
between men and women; (h) Respect for the evolving capacities of children
with disabilities and respect for the right of children with disabilities to preserve
their identities.
Guiding Principles of the Convention, http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?navid=
14&pid=156.
103. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral
International Convention on Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons
with Disabilities (2005), http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/adhoca57357e.htm.
104. One could attribute the lack of direction in the drafting process to the states' lack
of will to scrutinize the meaning of women's rights. The more cynical supposition is that
states had low expectations of being able to enforce those rights and, thus, little incentive to
parse out their meaning.
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rights cannot sit together or inform each other. 10 5 Instead, my purpose is to
reveal the competing influences that might undermine the effectiveness of
the Protocol going forward, particularly in the area of health and
reproductive rights. As explained in Part III, the result may be a document
whose text does not necessarily set a course for addressing the most
complex issues that African women face.

II. Theoretical Underpinningsof the Protocol
The Protocol incorporates various insights of feminist legal theories
that are represented in regional and international women's rights
instruments from the last thirty years. As Johanna Bond highlights, the
main influences on the Protocol--CEDAW and the Charter---draw from
documents with very different normative goals. 10 6 CEDAW came to life in
an era focused on formal equality, and the Charter is arguably a product of
an anti-colonialist movement that valued nationalism and cultural
identity. 0 7 Part I's discussion of the clash between equality and culture
makes clear that an attempt to incorporate both perspectives may also
entrench some of the debates among feminist theorists. In this Part, I will
describe the influence of liberal, dominance, and cultural feminism on the
Protocol and note its relevance to Article 14.

A. Formaland Substantive Equality
The Protocol, like the text of CEDAW, is based on the goal of equality
and is aligned with the goals of liberal feminism. 10 8 Article l(f) of the
105. I also do not attempt to catalogue all the influences found in the Protocol. Clearly
there are influences that I do not address here. For example, the Protocol pays heed to the
"third generation" rights such as the right to a healthy and sustainable environment in Article
18 or the right to sustainable development in Article 19. Arguably, some of this language
shows influences from the Charter and the work of the Gender Division of the Economic
Community of Western African States. See BANDA, supra note 8, at 57 (noting gender
division's emphasis on peacekeeping and finance).
106. See Johanna E. Bond, Gender, Discourse and Contemporary Law in Africa
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
107. Id.

108.

For a concise and useful account of liberal feminism's central tenets, see Rosalind

Dixon, FeministDisagreement(Comparatively)Recast, 31 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 277, 28081 (2008). Dixon notes liberal feminism's attention to the disadvantage attached to men's
and women's biological and thus gender roles. Id. Note also that CEDAW, as originally
conceived, shows the imprint of liberal feminism. General Recommendations and the reports
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Protocol mirrors Article 1 of CEDAW in its definition of discrimination, 0 9
and Article 2 of the Protocol emphasizes the duty of the state to eliminate
discrimination and promote equal protection in language similar to that of
Article 2 of CEDAW."I0 Provisions on marriage (excluding clauses on
polygamy and registered marriages, which are discussed below) are framed
in terms of equal rights. For example, Article 6 of the Protocol speaks of
the state's duty to "ensure that women and men enjoy equal rights and are
regarded as equal partners in marriage" in a fashion similar to CEDAW and
the ICCPR."' The Protocol's property rights in marriage mirror the
common law's understanding of separate property, as evidenced by equal
rights to acquire and manage property-to decide how to manage one's
affairs.
from the CEDAW Committee reveal a changing appreciation for how women's rights issues
are understood.
109. Fareda Banda, Blazing a Trail: The African Protocol on Women's Rights Comes
into Force, 50 J. AFRICAN L. 72, 74 (2006). Article 1(f) of the Protocol reads:
"'Discrimination against women' means any distinction, exclusion or restriction or any
differential treatment based on sex and whose objectives or effects compromise or destroy
the recognition, enjoyment or the exercise by women, regardless of their marital status, of
human rights and fundamental freedoms in all spheres of life." Protocol, supra note 1, art.
l(f).
CEDAW Article 1 reads:
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term 'discrimination against
women' shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of
sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis
of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in
the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.
CEDAW, supra note 10, art. 1.
110. Article 2(1) of the Protocol, like Article 2 of CEDAW, sets out the duties of
States' Parties in regard to combating discrimination "through appropriate legislative,
institutional and other measures." Protocol, supra note 1, art. 2(1). CEDAW Article 2(f)"To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws,
regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women",
CEDAW, supra note 10, art. 2(f),-is expanded upon in Protocol Article 2(2), Protocol,
supranote 1, art. 2(2).
111. See CEDAW, supra note 10, art. 16 ("States Parties shall take all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and
family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women.");
see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 23(4), entry intoforce Mar.
23, 1976, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm [hereinafter ICCPR] ("States Parties
to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and
responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution."). Article
23(4) goes on to state: "In the case of dissolution, provision shall be made for the necessary
protection of any children." Id. art. 23(4).
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Article 14's treatment of "the right to control fertility" and "the right to
choose any method of contraception" resonates with liberal feminism's
focus on equal and unencumbered choices. 1 2 The right to decide the
number and spacing of one's children in Article 14(1)(b) is drawn directly
from Article 16(1)(e) of CEDAW (with additional language in the
Protocol's version, as is noted in the next Part). Interestingly, choicefocused language sits uneasily with other provisions of the Protocol that
how abuse or discriminatory treatment undermines men's
acknowledge
3
1
agency.
Perhaps in answer to this criticism, the Protocol, like CEDAW, also
focuses on de facto or substantive equality (as well as on de jure
equality).' 14 Article 2 of the Protocol not only includes permission to "take
corrective and positive action in those areas where discrimination against
women in law and in fact continues to exist," but also addresses "the social
and cultural patterns of conduct of women and men."'' 15 Article 2(2) states
in full:
States Parties shall commit themselves to modify the social and cultural
patterns of conduct of women and men through public education,
information, education and communication strategies, with a view to
achieving the elimination of harmful cultural and traditional practices
and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or
the superiority of either of the sexes, or on stereotyped roles for women
and men.116
Article 2 highlights that discrimination in practice derives in part from
the continuance of harmful stereotypes. Article 12 more specifically
requires states "to eliminate all stereotypes 1' in17textbooks, syllabuses and the
media, that perpetuate such discrimination."
112. See Beijing Platform, supra note 40, para. 17 (discussing the right to control one's
own fertility).
113. Perhaps interpreting Article 14 as a matter of substantive equality as Roselynn
Musa does (who calls Article 14 "central to the realization of women's potential") would
meet concerns of access and the lived experiences of women seeking health care. Roselynn
Musa, Provisions of the Protocol, in BREATHING LIFE INTO THE AFRICAN UNION PROTOCOL
ON WOMEN's RIGHTS IN AFRICA 19, 22 (Roselynn Musa et al. eds., 2006).
114. See Banda, supra note 109, at 75 (noting that Article 2 of the Protocol builds on
Articles 2(f) and 5(a) of CEDAW); see also CEDAW General Recommendation No. 25, art.
1, para. 1,
4 on Temporary Special Measures, CEDAW/C/2004/WP.1/Rev.
http://www.un.org/ womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/index.html (supporting the
interpretation of CEDAW as requiring substantive equality).
115. Protocol, supranote 1, art. 2.
116. Id. art. 2(2).
117. Id. art. 12.
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The Protocol positions discrimination as a problem not only for the
state but also for private and community actors. This approach is consistent
with CEDAW, which has been interpreted to reach all manner of
discriminatory laws and practices regardless of whether such conduct is
caused by the state."
Article 14 also reflects CEDAW's influence by
emphasizing a state duty to "provide adequate, affordable and accessible
health services ... to women especially those in rural areas."'1 9 Article
14's emphasis on access to services, especially for marginalized women,
places importance on equality in the result and mirrors language that is
found in the ICPD and the Beijing Platform. 120 But as Part III will show,
the reference to services may lack the scope of its international
predecessors.
The Protocol, however, incorporates rights that deviate from an
equality approach-a consequence of compromises made during the
Protocol's drafting. Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia argued against
"equal rights" and for the principle of complementarity-the idea that laws
should reflect the distinct roles of women and men that align religious and
traditional norms.1 21 For example, adding the word "equitable" to the
description of property rights following divorce, separation, or annulment
in Article 7(d) reflects a major debate at the 2001 Experts Meeting. 122 The
concept of equity also appears in the description of a widow's share of
inheritance in Article 21.123

118. Symposium, TransnationalDiscourse,-RelationalAuthority, and the U.S. Court:
Gender Equality, 37 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 271,275-76 (2003).
119. Protocol, supra note 1, art. 14(2)(a).
120. Report of the International Conference on Population and Development,
A/CONF. 171/13 (18 Oct. 1994), para. 7.3, http://www.un.org/popin/icpd/conference/offeng/
poa.html; Beijing Platform, supra note 40, at paras. 95-96, 223; see Sandra Fredman,
Beyond the Dichotomy of Formal and Substantive Equality: Towards a New Definition of
Equal Rights, in TEMPORARY SPECIAL MEASURES: ACCELERATING DE FACTO EQUALITY OF

4(1) UN CONvENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 111, 114 (Ineke Boerefijn et al. eds., 2003) (contrasting
formal equality with an equality of results approach, which focuses on "equali[zing] the
starting point" by giving women equal access to the benefits of society); see also Musa,
supra note 113, at 22 (describing reproductive rights as "central to the realisation of
[women's] potential").
121. Banda, supra note 109, at 76.
122. See id. at 74 (discussing the distinction between "equal" and "equitable"). Similar
language also appears in Article 7, guaranteeing that "women and men have reciprocal rights
and responsibilities towards children." Protocol, supra note 1, art. 7.
123. Protocol, supra note 1, art. 21.
WOMEN UNDER ARTICLE
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It has been noted elsewhere that 'equitable' and 'equal' do not share
the same meaning. 124 The CEDAW Committee stated in a concluding
observation that the two terms, equal and equity, were not interchangeable
because equality is a more objective measure whereas equity is situational.
Interestingly, Article 14 does not follow CEDAW in emphasizing rights
based on the "equality of men and women." Although this framing may
portend a more expansive reading of Article 14, it could also be read in the
same terms as the 'equitable v. equal debate.' That is, the Article 14 state
duty to protect and respect the health of women may allow for different
treatment of men and women so long as the state is acting to accommodate
women's particular needs.
B. Dominance Feminism and the Treatment of Violence
Other language in the Protocol is distinctly driven by dominance
feminism, which reflects the post-CEDAW attention given to the sexual
exploitation of women and deep debates among feminists about the role of
state power and the sources of women's oppression. 125 Dominance
feminism explains women's inequality as a product of "a system of sexual
subordination in which men define themselves as subjects, and women as
objects."'126 The Protocol reflects the approach of dominance feminism with
its emphasis on protecting women from violence, including state violence
(such as in conflict or war), family or intimate violence, violence or
harassment in public institutions, and cultural violence. 127 For example, the
right to dignity in Article 3 focuses on dignity as freedom from "any
exploitation or degradation of women" and "protection of women from all
forms of violence, particularly sexual and verbal violence." 28 The Protocol
reaches beyond CEDAW and regional instruments in its extensive
treatment of violence, causing one commentator to note that the provisions

124. Banda, supra note 109, at 77-78.
125. The Protocol drew from the Southern Africa Development Council Addendum on
Violence and the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. Banda, supra
note 109, at 79. CEDAW makes no reference to violence, although later CEDAW
documents deal with issues of violence. Id.
126. See Dixon, supra note 108, at 282 (citing the work of Catharine MacKinnon,
Andrea Dworkin, and others).
127. See Banda, supra note 109, at 79 (addressing the themes of violence against
women in the family, the community and "public violence").
128. Protocol, supra note 1, art. 3.
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addressing abuse
or exploitation of women is where "the Protocol comes
129
own."'
its
into
Violence against women is treated specifically as a problem for the
law to solve (in addition to being addressed as a pervasive and ever-present
phenomenon). In several places, the Protocol imposes sanctions on
perpetrators for violent or harassing behavior.' 3 One of the most striking
examples is the Protocol's treatment of female genital mutilation (the
phrase used by the Protocol). The choice to use 'female genital mutilation,'
rather than female genital cutting or female circumcision, also reflects a
position that resonates with dominance feminist thinking. Female genital
mutilation (FGM) has been some feminists' prime example of the way in
which a customary practice in a patriarchal society controls women's
sexuality. Research documenting the health outcomes of FGM need not be
restated here; much time and attention has been paid to the deleterious
effects of the most drastic (although less commonly practiced) forms of
female circumcision.3' Those wishing to emphasize the violent nature of
the female circumcision procedure have objected to the use of alternative
phrasing that may convey less judgment about the practice.
In addition to its choice of language, the Protocol's invocation of state
power to limit customary violence also reflects the influence of dominance
feminism. Article 5 obliges States Parties to outlaw the practice of FGM
and to provide health and rehabilitative services for those who have already
undergone FGM. 132 Requiring more than present international1 33
standards,
the Protocol requires "legislative measures backed by sanctions.
Other provisions of the Protocol also criminalize certain practices and
invoke the power of the law (or the state)s to protect women134-a strategy
129. Banda, supra note 109, at 79.
130. For example, Article 12(l)(b) of the Protocol provides for sanctions against the
perpetrators of "all forms of abuse, including sexual harassment in schools and other
educational institutions." Protocol, supra note 1, art. 12(l)(b). See also Protocol, supra note
1, art. 13(m) (requiring the state to "take effective legislative and administrative measures to
prevent the exploitation and abuse of women in advertising and pornography").
131. See Note, What's Culture Got To Do With It? Excising the Harmful Tradition of
Female Circumcision, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1944, 1946-1947 (1993) (describing three forms
of female circumcision (excision, clitoridectomy, and infibulations) and the range of their
invasiveness).
132. Protocol, supra note 1, art. 5.
133. Id.
134. For example, Article 6(d), requires marriages "to be recorded in writing and
registered in accordance with national laws, in order to be legally recognized." Id. art. 6(d).
Banda notes that this might undermine the many marriages on the continent that are not
registered. Banda, supra note 109, at 76. See also Protocol, supra note 1, art. 7(a)
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often aligned with dominance feminism because it casts men as perpetrators
and the state as the entity responsible for holding them accountable. 35 For
example, Article 14(1)(d) sets out the "right to self protection and to be
This right is
protected against sexually transmitted infections."' 136
strengthened by Article 14(1)(e) which specifies that the "right to be
informed on the health status of one's partner, particularly if affected with
sexually transmitted infections, including H1V/AIDS."'137 Research posits
that the spread of HIV to women is in large part due to women's lack of
power in negotiating when and how sex occurs (including practicing safe
sex). 138 As Part III discusses, Article 14(1) could have incorporated any
number of approaches to the impact of HIV infection on women. Instead it
focuses solely on the problem of women who are infected unknowingly or
unwittingly by their husbands or partners. The language of Article 14(l)(d)
focuses on the power dynamic between men and women and uses the power
differential to incorporate socio-economic concerns (such as access to
medicine) and dignitary harms (such as ending the stigma associated with
women living with HIV).
C. CulturalFeminism and GenderDifferences
The Protocol was also influenced by cultural feminism, which seeks to
value and protect the differences (biological and social) that make women
distinct from men. 139 Unlike dominance feminism, which situates gender
differences in terms of the perpetuation of male power, and unlike liberal
feminism, which explains disparate treatment based on gender as unjust,
cultural feminism embraces roles traditionally aligned with women (like
motherhood) and argues that injustice is the result of devaluing those roles.
The Protocol recognizes a standalone right for pregnant or nursing women
(requiring that "separation, divorce or annulment of a marriage shall be effected by judicial
order").
135. See Janet Halley et al., From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal
Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in
Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 335, 341 (2006)
(discussing the unintended consequences of feminists' reliance on criminalization).
136. Protocol, supra note 1, art. 14(1)(d).
137. Id. art. 14(1)(e).
138. BANDA, supra note 8, at 192-93 (discussing women's reluctance to ask for
protected sex out of fear of violence from their partner).
139. See Dixon, supra note 108, at 281 (citing authors such as Robin West and Carol
Gilligan when drawing a distinction between cultural and liberal feminism).
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or women in detention to an environment "suitable to their condition and
the right to be treated with dignity.' 40 In a similar vein, Article 4(j)
ensures no death penalty is inflicted on pregnant or nursing women, 14 ' and
Article 13(h) seeks to "recognise the economic value of the work of women
in the home." 142 These articles protect particular sub-populations of
disadvantaged women-the elderly, the disabled, and "women in distress,"
which includes poor women and "women heads of families."
Related to reproductive rights, Article 14(2)(b) protects mothers
directly by creating a state duty to "establish and strengthen existing prenatal, delivery and post-natal health and nutritional services for women
during pregnancy and while they are breast-feeding., 143 The language, like
that for pregnant women in detention, carves out special protection for
mothers. This could be troubling for both dominance and liberal feminism.
Liberal feminism could object to relying on a stereotype of maternal health
needs for women or marginalizing other reproductive health needs (like
treatment of STIs or screening for cervical cancer). Dominance feminism
could view the caretaking role as a product of a private/public distinction
that works to women's disadvantage and men's advantage. But cultural
feminism could exist on a common ground with the language of the
Protocol using a substantive equality analysis: Because many women act in
a caretaking role and the majority of women become mothers, the Protocol
should recognize that reality of women's lives and cater to it.
The Protocol does not appear to favor one reading over another.
However, the Protocol does seek to temper the culture/equality debate in
one regard: Cultural feminism may be more aligned with the approach
taken in the Charter, which acknowledges the primacy and importance of
custom and tradition to communal identity. The contribution of cultural
feminism is to recognize women's important role in maintaining and
shaping that tradition.'" This approach is reflected in Article 17, which,
like the Charter, tries to promote respect for women's roles within their
communities. The first clause of Article 17 creates the right to a "positive
140. Protocol, supra note 1, art. 24(b).
141. Id. art. 40). Arguably, this language is also intended to serve the interests of the
fetus. See infra Part III (highlighting the Protocol's references to women's maternal role).
142. Id. art. 13(h).
143. Id. art. 14(2)(b).
144. One of the clear purposes of the Protocol was to temper the language of the
Charter, and, clearly, the Preamble's requirement that African values must be in compliance
with "equality, peace, freedom, dignity, justice, solidarity, and democracy" goes to that end.
Id. Preamble.
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1 45
cultural context" and to participate in determining cultural policies.
Taken in conjunction with Article 18-the right to protect and enable
development of "women's indigenous knowledge" (seemingly a
replacement for the Charter's phrase, "cultural development")-the right
to
46
a positive cultural context may call for the reform of customary laws.1
Differing theoretical vantage points will yield different interpretations
of the Protocol. The following Part will show how these influences may be
at cross purposes in interpreting the Protocol's treatment of health and
reproductive rights.

III. Problems with the Protocol'sTreatment of Health
and Reproductive Rights
The different feminist influences on the Protocol highlight the
incoherence of the Protocol as a modem women's rights instrument, and
these conflicts are at issue in the interpretation of Article 14. The previous
Part highlighted what those influences are and how Article 14 might reflect
each of them. The central question in this Part is how the absence of basic
definitional principles for the drafting process left the Protocol vulnerable
to competing accounts of women's rights, which may stunt the document's
future interpretation. As a way of thinking about Article 14 more critically,
this Part discusses three shortcomings of Article 14 as it is currently
configured: the inability to weave together feminist approaches in a way
that recognizes the interdependence of various issues; the
underdevelopment of women's rights to comprehensive health care; and the
contradictory acknowledgment of women's "natural" role as mothers and
women's rights to autonomy and to be free from stereotype.
Article 14 has two sections. The first section ensures the "right to
health of women, including sexual and reproductive health is respected and
promoted"' 47 and elaborates on that right by setting out six particular areas
of control or decision-making. These areas include the right to control
fertility; the right to decide whether to have children, the number of
children, and the spacing of children; the right to choose any method of
contraception; the right to self protection and to be protected against
145. Id. art. 17.
146. See Charter, supra note 5, art. 29(7) (stating the goal of promoting the moral well
being of society); see also Beyani, supra note 32, at 285 (discussing how the Charter showed
that Africa recognized general concepts of human rights).
147. Protocol, supra note 1, art. 14.
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sexually transmitted infections; the right to be informed of one's health
status and the health
status of one's partner; and the right to have family
148
planning education.
The second section refers to "appropriate measures" States Parties
shall undertake to accomplish three goals. The first goal is to "provide
adequate, affordable and accessible health services, including information,
education and communication programmes to women especially those in
rural areas.' 49 The second is to "establish and strengthen existing prenatal, delivery and post-natal health and nutritional services for women
during pregnancy and while they are breast-feeding."' 50 And the third, and
perhaps most controversial,' 51 is to "protect the reproductive rights of
women by authorising medical abortion in cases of sexual assault, rape,
incest, and where the continued pregnancy endangers the mental
and
15 2
physical health of the mother or the life of the mother or the foetus.'
As heralded elsewhere, Article 14 of the Protocol represents important
'firsts,' such as the first time that the right to abortion or the right to control
one's own fertility is explicitly enumerated in human rights law. 153 Article
14 also recognizes rights with longstanding histories, such as the right to
decide the number and spacing of children. But Article 14 (and perhaps the
Protocol in general) does not appear to ground its approach to reproductive
health in a way that embraces the area's complexity. Certainly, issues like
the prohibition of FGM or early marriage resonate with concerns about
protecting women's reproductive health, yet the Protocol does not refer
back to or connect these issues. The provision related to FGM could have
been even more powerful if it were linked to women's sexual and
reproductive freedom. One major objection to FGM, highlighted briefly in
the previous section, is that it can impair women's future fertility or ability

148. Article 14(1)(e) reads in full: "[Tlhe right to be informed on one's health status
and on the health status of one's partner, particularly if affected with sexually transmitted
infections, including HIV/AIDS, in accordance with internationally recognised standards
and best practices." Id. art. 14(l)(e).
149. Id. art. 14(2).
150. Id. art. 14(2).
151. See Banda, supra note 109, at 82 (discussing how Libya, Rwanda, and Senegal
opposed the right to a medical abortion in the Protocol).
152. Protocol, supra note 1, art. 14(2).
153. See Gawaya & Mukasa, supra note 9, at 42 (stating that the Protocol is the first
document in international law to recognize a woman's right to a medical abortion); BANDA,
supra note 8, at 80 (stating that the Protocol was the first international document to discuss
substantive reproductive rights and the right to an abortion).
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to experience sexual pleasure. 5 4 The Protocol could have acknowledged
that the cultural barriers to eliminating circumcision are rooted in
communities that value female chastity or sexual submission. 5 Linking
the rights in Article 5 to the right to healthy sexual development could have
tempered the emphasis on violence previously described. Similarly, the
prohibition on early marriage could have been explicitly connected to the
health risks associated with early childbirth and to the loss of sexual and
reproductive decision-making it entails for many girls.156 A more integrated
approach could have linked the rights in ways that could have strengthened
their substantive content. The Protocol fails to build upon the growing
consensus that reproductive health issues are related to socio-economic as
well as civil and political rights for women. 57
Article 14 is titled a health right and references a state duty to "provide
adequate, affordable and accessible health services, and information,
education and communication programmes to women especially those in
rural areas."' 58 For a text that deals broadly with women's health, Article
14 underemphasizes developments in international thinking about access to
healthcare. For example, the ICESCR recognizes the right to the highest
attainable standard of healthcare.' 59 The Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights further elaborated on what the highest attainable
standard for women means by endorsing "a comprehensive national
strategy for promoting women's right to health throughout their life span"
that would include "prevention and treatment of diseases affecting women,
as well as policies to provide access to a full range of high quality and
affordable health care, including sexual and reproductive services," and
"removal of all barriers interfering with access to health services, education

154. See REBECCA COOK ET AL., REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 263-66
(2003) (describing how female circumcision in deeply embedded in the practices of several
East and West African communities).
155. Id. Rachel Murray notes that the articles of FGC are not wholly in line with the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Harmful Practices Affecting the
Fundamental Rights of Women and Girls. See Murray, supra note 2, at 269 n.96 (noting that
the Protocol addresses the healthcare needs of rural women but not migrants and prostitutes).
156. BANDA, supra note 8, at 186-87.
157. See COOK, supra note 154, at 8-9 (emphasizing the significance of reproductive
health for women because "[l]ifestyle, behaviour, and socio-economic conditions play an
important role in promoting or undermining reproductive health").
158. Protocol, supra note 1, art. 14(2)(a).
159. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), 12, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
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160
and information, including in the area of sexual and reproductive health."'
Most significantly, the Charter itself relies on a "best attainable" standard in
Article 16161 as does Article 14 of the African Charter on the Rights and
Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), which recognizes the right to "the best
out a
attainable state of physical, mental and spiritual health" and sets
1 62
number of state duties in furtherance of the best attainable standard.
The Protocol's promise of adequate health potentially falls short of a
best attainable standard because it sets a floor rather than ceiling: The state
only needs to provide adequate healthcare that meets women's needs rather
a range of services based on best practices. Article 14 could have imposed
a the duty on states to reconsider the allocation of resources in order to
achieve better delivery of health services and the highest attainable standard
(such as directing state funds toward the development of primary health
care systems). This approach would not have been out of step with other
language in the Protocol. For example. Article 4(i) creates a state duty to
"provide adequate budgetary and other resources for the implementation
and monitoring of
actions aimed at preventing and eradicating violence
63
women."
against
One example where a better standard for health might have been
useful is in the Protocol's treatment of HIV/AIDS. The rights to selfprotection from HIV and to know a partner's HIV status were added at the
2001 Experts Meeting but have been criticized as far too narrow in light of
the scope of the HIV epidemic.' 64 International documents have addressed
HIV in terms of a right to the highest attainable standard of health, as well
as to dignity and equality. 165 This standard means more than recognizing

160. U.N. EcoN. & Soc. COUNCIL, COMM. ON ECON., Soc. & CULTURAL RIGHTS,
Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and CulturalRights, 21, U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/2000/4 (Nov. 8, 2000).
161. See Charter, supra note 5, art. 16(1) ("Every individual shall have the right to
enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health.").
162. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Organization of African
Unity, 1990, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49, entered into force Nov. 29, 1999 [hereinafter
ACRWC].
163. Protocol, supra note 1, art. 4(i). Note also that Article 10, the Right to Peace,
states: "States Parties shall take the necessary measures to reduce military expenditure
significantly in favour of spending on social development in general, and the promotion of
women in particular." Id. art. 10.
164. See Banda, supra note 109, at 81 (questioning how many women would dare ask
their partners if they were infected with HIV).
165. See CooK, supra note 154, at 12 (examining the expanding definition of
reproductive health in international law). It is also strange that there is no language that link
women's inequality with susceptibility to HIV, as the CEDAW Committee has.
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the right to non-discrimination based on one's health status; the highest
attainable standard of health has been interpreted as active government
participation in seeking the most effective treatments for those living with
HIV and in stemming the spread of HIV. Additionally, the right to dignity
(as interpreted in the South African context, for example 166) implies there is
a role for state and private actors to counteract the stigma that has attached
to HIV historically.
Finally, the Protocol sends conflicting messages about confronting
stereotypes of women as mothers. On one hand, Article 14's approach is
intended to de-stigmatize reproductive autonomy by situating it within
Article 14's health rights. On the other hand, Article 14 does not
necessarily confront assumptions about aspects of women's familial and
societal roles. Much has been written about how expectations that women
conform to the role of wife or mother limit women's autonomy and
agency. 167 Certain cultural norms do not recognize women's reproductive
or sexual rights because sexuality itself is considered masculine,' 68 and
customary laws addressing reproductive capacity and a woman's role in the
family are designed to ensure
male control over women's sexual behavior
69
and reproductive decisions.
As noted in Part I, the special protection for women as mothers is one
of the main points of criticism of the Charter, 170 and it is one that created
tension in earlier international documents.' 7' The Protocol's language may
reaffirm women's maternal role (based in part on the ACRWC) despite
emphasizing autonomy-based rights, such as a right to decide the number
and spacing of one's children. The Protocol seeks to embrace women's
166. See Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) (2002) (5) SA 721
(CC) (S. Afr.) (holding a right to most effective treatment); N M v. Smith (2007) (5) SA 250
(CC) (S. Aft.) (elaboratingon the ways in which the dignity of HIV-positive persons is
threatenedby societalstigma).
167. See Sylvia Tamale, Gender Trauma in Africa: EnhancingAccess to Resources, 48
J. AFuCAN L. 50, 52-53 (2004) (arguing that women's reproductive capacity is one factor in
a naturalization of gender roles and in dichotomization of the public and private spheres).
168. BANDA, supra note 8, at 173.
169. See Adjetey, supra note 23, at 1352-53 (arguing that cultural traditions around
reproduction "keep African women in cultural subordination and put them in such a low
bargaining position that they have little, if any, control over decisions which affect their
bodily integrity").
170. Charter, supra note 5, art. 16(1).
171. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 25, U.N. GAOR 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] (granting special
care and assistance for mothers); CEDAW, supra note 10, art. 12(2) (addressing "pregnancy,
confinement, and the post-natal period").
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special role as mothers by protecting pregnant and nursing women. Article
14 emphasizes pre-natal, delivery, and post-natal health and nutritional
services for women during pregnancy. 72 This observation is not intended
to minimize the importance of pre-natal and post-natal care for women or to
ignore its recognition in international human rights law, such as the Article
12 right to health in CEDAW, which almost exclusively focuses on
maternal health. 73 But the Protocol appears to cut against the stereotype of
women as mothers in several places. One instance is the right to decide
"whether to have children," which complements the right to decide the
174
number and spacing of children (language taken from CEDAW).
Perhaps this language could have been expanded: Article 14, which speaks
to a reproductive health agenda concerned with family planning, could have
included language that more
directly related to sexual and procreative
75
autonomy or well-being.
Serving as a counterintuitive example of the implicit support of
maternal stereotypes, the right to an abortion may inadvertently align with a
pro-natalist vision for women. Article 14(2)(c) identifies a right to medical
abortion for women for whom it is popularly accepted that motherhood may
be unwanted-women who are victims of rape, incest, or sexual assault.
The striking aspect of Article 14(2)(c) is the right to medical abortion for
the women whose physical or mental health is at risk. This provision for
mental health stands in contrast with most of the abortion laws in Africa,
many of which recognize no right to an abortion on that ground (or any of
the grounds stated in Article 14(2)(c) for that matter). 7 6 That being said,
172. Protocol, supra note 1, art. 14(2)(b).
173. Article 12 of CEDAW reads:
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of
equality of men and women, access to health care services, including those
related to family planning. 2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph I of
this article, States Parties shall ensure to women appropriate services in
connection with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal period, granting free
services where necessary, as well as adequate nutrition during pregnancy and
lactation.
CEDAW, supra note 10, art. 12.
174. Protocol, supra note 1, art. 14.
175. See Banda, supra note 109, at 81 (noting that the ICPD radically changed the
international framework for reproductive rights by shifting from family planning to
individual health and well-being); see also CoOK, supra note 154, at 4 (stating that the ICPD
adopted the first internationally-recognized definition of reproductive health).
176. See Chad Gerson, Toward an International Standard of Abortion Rights:
Empirical Data from Africa, 18 PACE INT'L L. REv. 373, 377 (2006) (conducting an
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the right to a legal abortion because of a risk to mental health is justified on
the same grounds as the right to an abortion for a woman who has a
sympathetic reason-mental infirmity-for not wanting to become a
mother. 177
The Protocol could have tried to uncouple stereotypes about women by
including text that recognized the rights of those women who are not
mothers or wives. For instance, what would creating a positive cultural
context under Article 17 look like for those women who choose not to
mother? Instead, the Protocol is better characterized as accepting the
"benevolent" stereotype of women as caretaker1 78 and lacks critical
engagement with the ways that stereotypes conflict with rights rooted in
language of self determination.
IV. Conclusion
The tension between the elimination of stereotypes and the special
recognition of motherhood and has long been at the center of the feminist
debate. Article 14 may have missed an opportunity to tie together the
elimination of stereotypes, women's role in the family, and reproductive
and sexual health in a way particular to an African context. This may have
been especially important to young women and girls whose rights are
scattered throughout the Protocol in inconsistent ways. 179 Moreover, the
Protocol could have framed reproductive rights within broader objectives,
such as the elimination of poverty and disease 80 and the reform of
colonialist laws. 181
empirical study of the tolerance of abortion in African states); see also Banda, supra note
109, at 82 (questioning whether Article 14(2)(c) will be enforced because of the variation in
member states' laws on abortion).
177. Article 14(2)(c) refers to a "medical abortion," which is administered only in the
first trimester of pregnancy. Protocol, supra note 1, art. 14(2)(c). This may limit the
clause's application to second or third trimester abortions.
178. Rebecca Cook, Washington and Lee Symposium, April 3, 2009.
179. For example, see Articles 1(k) in definition, Article 11 in conflict, Article 12 in
schools. Protocol, supra note 1, arts. l(k), 11, 12. A couple of these provisions refer to
male children also. Id. art. 11. Article 13(g) in particular prohibits the work of children and
exploitation of the "girl-child." Id. art. 13(g).
180. See Odinkalu, supra note 16, at 3 (discussing how the African continent's
tumultuous history makes it difficult to achieve even modest progress in the realm of human
rights).
181. See Charles Ngwena, An Appraisal of Abortion Laws in Southern Africa from a
Reproductive Health Rights Perspective, 32 J. L. MED. & ETHics 708 (2004) (showing the
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This Article, though critical of the Protocol in many ways, is not
fatalistic about its potential promise. Bold and clear application of the
implementation and interpretation clauses could ensure that the Protocol
evolves into a responsive instrument for women. Article 26 creates a duty
to "indicate the legislative and other measures undertaken for the full
realisation of the rights [of the Protocol] in a state's periodic reports
submitted in accordance with Article 62 of the African Charter."'182 There is
room for the same powerful lobby that helped bring the Protocol into force
to help shape the ways in which states interpret and implement Protocol
provisions. The caveat in Article 31-that "[n]one of the provisions of the.
. . Protocol shall affect more favourable provisions... in the national
legislation of States Parties or in any other regional, continental or
international conventions, treaties or agreements applicable in these States
Parties"'83 -could be the platform by which Protocol provisions are
measured against future innovations in women's human rights thinking.
Finally, in according the power to interpret the Protocol to the African
Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) (which is not yet
operational), Article 27 creates room to imbue a new institution that has a
clean slate with a sense of responsibility for the development of women's
rights.
The Protocol represents a great deal of possibility even if the process
of coming to terms with the Protocol's meaning happens after its
ratification. Despite shortcomings in its drafting or limitations to its textual
interpretation, the mechanisms described above might aid willing member
states and NGOs to support a progressive, substantive vision for the
Protocol-one that will evolve to meet African women's diverse and
changing needs.

imprint of colonial legacies on current abortion laws in southern Africa); see also Odinkalu,
supra note 16, at 11 (noting that new bills of rights have not been followed by the repeal of
colonial era legislation).
182. Protocol, supra note 1, art. 26.
183. Id. art. 31.

